COMMENTARY: In defense of Inang Laya  

It is in our national interest that we Filipinos perform our duty and exercise our responsibilities to defend Inang Laya. From the time we lost our security cover when the U.S. bases were terminated in 1991, succeeding administrations should have continuously filled the void to secure the country.

As I know it, the Ramos administration laid the foundations to establish credible deterrence to secure our maritime and aerospace domains, but the lack of consistent follow-through has left the country defenseless against a foreign adversary equipped for modern warfare today. 

 

The AFP’s modernization was legislated in 1995 following China’s theft of Mischief Reef on the pretext of building temporary shelters for typhoon threatened fishermen, a few years after the departure of the US Navy. It timed the grab when the U.S. was still quite upset with the Philippines, and a couple of years after President Ramos’ state visit to meet with President Jiang Zemin. To think that during that state visit we exchanged notes about the historical, economic and sociocultural affinity of both countries that spanned centuries.

 

Oftentimes the question is asked: granted that the past three administrations (Estrada, Arroyo and Aquino) have not done enough to bring the country’s defense to a state of “credible deterrence,” what did the Ramos administration do to address the challenges of external defense despite its resource handicap? The economic collapse following the 1989 coup; three (3) years of brownouts that ended in 1993, and the Asian Financial Crisis that hit the Philippines starting in mid-1997 hampered the administration’s capacity to pivot to external defense from internal security operations. 

 

Let me just say up front that it takes an estimated 10-15 years to put together the wherewithal to establish credible deterrence. It starts with defining our national interests from which a defense strategy is formulated followed by a national defense plan. Acquiring capital assets is only one part of that plan.

Other equally crucial components are: vital infrastructure to support our capital assets; selection and training of personnel to include interoperable combat and service support proficiency; and support systems that ensure seamless operations. Behind all that requires a civilian leadership that provides clear command guidance and timely financial, political, legal and diplomatic support for the Armed Forces to fulfill its missions.

 

That said, these are the salient facts that I recall and from research to enable the reader to appreciate what was done. Institutional memory is important because knowing our past allows us to understand the present and helps us chart our future. 

 

AFP Modernization

 

In February 1995, Congress passed R.A. 7898 or the AFP Modernization Law that obliged the government to fund and allocate a separate budget for a 15-year modernization program. The AFP Modernization Fund was to come from the proceeds of the sale of a portion of Fort Bonifacio.

The purchase value of the property that Bonifacio Land Corporation (BLC) agreed to buy from the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) was P30.556-billion. The AFP’s modernization program was one of twenty beneficiaries of the sale’s proceeds. The AFP’s share of the pie to kick start its modernization amounted to P5.484-billion, or around 18%.

 

I hasten to add that even before R.A. 7898 was passed, the plans to beef up the Armed Forces were already being laid out due to the loss of the U.S. security cover. 

 

Philippine Navy
 

Philippine Navy ship purchases between 1993 and 1998 included the following: two (2) Frank Besson class 4,200 ton amphibious transports (1993-1994), two (2) Philippine-made large patrol gunboats, 279 tons (1995-1998), twelve (12) South Korean Sea Killer 74-ton patrol gunboats (1993-1994), six (6) South Korean Sea Dolphin 170-ton patrol gunboats (May 1995) and twenty four (24) Halter Marine 56-ton patrol craft (1996-1998).

 

A P3.5-billion peso overhaul program from 1996-2000 for 10 large vessels, 4 transport ships, 1 repair ship, 1 multi-mission vessel and 4 patrol ships. The overhauls included replacing main and auxiliary engines; enhancing electrical systems; structural improvements; and new fire-control, weapons and anti-ship missile systems. 

 

In August 1995, South Korea transferred and delivered five (5) Chamsuri - Wildcat class fast attack crafts former ROKN ships to the Philippine government. Another vessel was delivered in 1998. In 1997, three (3) Peacock class ships of the Royal Navy were sold to the Philippines as a sign of goodwill for US$ 20 Million, and were officially turned over to the Philippine Navy on 1 August 1997 when Hong Kong was ceded back to China.

 

Philippine Air Force

 

Since the 1990s, the PAF has been using the S-211 as a trainer with secondary attack capability. These were redesignated as AS-211S and nicknamed as "Warriors." With the retirement of the F-5 fighters in 2005, the additional task of air defense was assigned to it as well.

Because of this, the PAF initiated some improvements to the AS-211S to improve its combat capability through a series of programs and innovations.

 

"Project Falcon" installed the Norsight Optical Sight from retired F-5s into the AS-211. “Project Falcon Uniform” repainted the aircraft with low visibility markings to reduce their overall visibility followed this.

"Project Falcon Hear" program optimized air-ground communications on the AS-211. They were also fitted with a belly gun pod, designed, developed and manufactured by a local company. Each Pod is equipped with an M3 .50 cal. machine gun, an automatic charger and 240 rounds of ammunition.

 

Between 1965 and 1999, the PAF acquired 37 F-5A/B from Taiwan and South Korea.  By the 1990's, only a few were flying. Due to the country’s financial constraints, the PAF opted in the mid-1990’s to retain its F-5 fleet by procuring an additional 15 airframes for spare parts and outright replacement of existing aircraft from Jordan and South Korea.

 

The delivery of the S.Korean fighter planes was part of a program to strengthen the logistics support capabilities of both the Korean and the Philippine Armed Forces as contained in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Logistics and Defense Industry Cooperation entered into by both governments on 24 May 1994. The MOU covered expanded and enhanced logistical cooperation such as procurement, supply, maintenance, and transportation.

 

The PAF received 24 OV-10As from the U.S. in 1991, followed by nine (9) more from the U.S. during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, and eight ex-Thai Air Force OV-10Cs in 2003–2004 (GMA's term). 

 

What happened to the AFP's modernization fund?
 

As mentioned earlier, BLC acquired a property from the BCDA for P30.556-billion. The AFP was one of twenty beneficiaries of the sale’s proceeds, and its share amounted to P5.484-billion. This amount was remitted by the BCDA to the Bureau of the Treasury in seven tranches from 28 February 1995 to 09 December 1997.

 

The Bureau of Treasury placed the amount of P5.484-billion in Special Account No A5514-170 earmarked for the AFP Modernization Program. This was reflected in the corresponding Bureau of Treasury JOURNAL VOUCHER NO. 4607438.

 

On April 30, 1998, shortly before the national election, the AFP advised the Office of the President of its readiness to manage the Trust Fund for the AFP Modernization Program (after training the Senior Officers and staff concerned). President Ramos decided that the Fund’s management be left to the incoming administration after his turnover of the presidency on June 30, 1998.

 

Early in the Estrada Administration, the use of the trust fund for the AFP’s modernization was set aside. A letter dated July 21, 1998 from former DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno to then DND Secretary Orlando Mercado said that: “The release of the said amount as requested by the AFP cannot be effected.” It was based on Sec. Diokno’s “Memorandum for the President” dated July 8, 1998 which stated that “AFP Modernization will be postponed for a better time when the financial crisis is over or when the Program can be continuously pursued.”

 

On May 29, 2000, the DBM issued a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) to the AFP for P5.484-billion. This release was equivalent to the money that President Ramos turned over to the Estrada administration, and coincided with the period between March and July 2000 when the AFP undertook its punitive operations against the MILF. The DBM disbursed approximately P50-million and P60-million more on June 26 and August 21, 2000, respectively, from the AFP Modernization Fund.

 

The foregoing established that the initial amount of P5.484-billion from the proceeds of the real estate transaction between BCDA and BLC for the AFP’s Modernization Fund remained intact during and until the end of the Ramos Administration on June 30, 1998; and that, thereafter, subsequent administrations exercised control of the fund that kept growing in step with the steady growth and development of Fort Bonifacio.

 

At this point, given the current poor state of our national defense, an audit must be undertaken to determine accuracy of the Fund’s financial statements, funds flows and management integrity, from 1998-2015.

For almost two decades, building "credible deterrence" has been hampered by corrupted self-serving politics. Our national leaders have ignored their bounden duty and responsibility to secure and defend the country. They continue the shameless practice of seeking foreign help to do what they’re supposed to. 

 

The protection of our allies must be seen only as temporary and supplementary. They have their national interests to protect first, and we have ours. It is not often that all our national interests intersect like it does today in the West Philippine Sea. Even then, in the event of an armed conflict, we are not a reliable link in the coalition of the free given our decrepit state of defense readiness.

The silver lining is that the 2nd AFP Modernization Act was passed during the present administration’s term. What it’s doing about it persistently and methodically is the question to ask.

 

In the long run, we must rely on our capacity to defend our territory, protect our resources and uphold our sovereignty, the way that all self-respecting nations do.

We must be the captain of our ship and the master of our fate.

 

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Rafael Alunan III headed the Department of Tourism from 1991 to 1992 under former Pres. Corazon Aquino. Alunan later headed the Department of the Interior and Local Government from 1992 to 1996. He is co-convenor of the West Philippine Sea Coalition.